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ARGUMENT
I.

MR. MARIN HAS PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF THE PARTIES' COURSE OF
DEALING AND CONDUCT.
Plaintiff first contends that Mr. Marin's reliance on the

covenant of good faith and fair dealing is misplaced because his
affidavit provides no evidence of a "'course of dealing."
Br. 13).

(Resp.

In support of this contention, plaintiff relies solely

on paragraph 4 of Mr. Marin's affidavit, which plaintiff refers
to as a "prior oral agreement about ^marketing tools'".

(Resp.

Br. 13). According to plaintiff, paragraph 4 of Mr. Marin's
affidavit "is not 'course of dealing' evidehce, it is extrinsic
evidence of 'new, independent rights and duties' not contained in
the parties' subsequent, expressly-integrated written Agreement."
(Resp. Br. 13).
Mr. Marin believes that plaintiff's contention is revealing
in that it completely disregards paragraphs 5, 7-9, and 11-13 of
his affidavit, in which Mr. Marin provides specific and detailed
testimony regarding the parties' course of dealing and conduct.
In paragraph 5 of his Affidavit, Mr. Marin testifies that
after plaintiff failed to provide the marketing tools necessary
for him to do his job he spent more than a month working on his
own with
... the third party vendor [of the marketing tools] hired by
plaintiff, Rainmaker Consulting, in order [to] expedite the
delivery of the marketing tools. I wrote more than 20
marketing and training scripts for video and web based
content. On two occasions, I traveled to St. Augustine,
1

Florida to work with Rainmaker Consulting shooting marketing
videos.
(R. 0125)
In paragraph 7 of his Affidavit, Mr. Marin testifies that
[o]n or about February 7, 2005, after plaintiff failed to
provide the marketing tools as promised, I contacted Gary
Young, plaintiff's Chief Executive Officer, and David
Stirling, plaintiff's Chief Operating Officer, with my
growing concerns about my ability to meet the performance
guarantees. Mr. Young and Mr. Stirling acknowledged that
plaintiff had failed to perform as promised, assured me that
my inability to satisfy the performance guarantees wrould not
affect my receipt of the advance payment of $25,000 due
February 15, 2005, and expressed their confidence that the
marketing tools would be ready for my use by mid-February to
early March 2005.
(R. 0125-0124)
In paragraph 8 of his Affidavit, Mr. Marin testifies that on
or about March 16, 2005, he informed Steve Bentley, plaintiff's
Chief Financial Officer that his
... failure to satisfy his performance guarantee was the
unavoidable result of plaintiff's failure to provide the
promised marketing tools, that I could and would meet my
performance guarantees when the tools were provided, and
that I expected plaintiff to continue making payment to me
in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. Mr. Bentley
acknowledged that plaintiff had failed to perform as
promised, represented that plaintiff anticipated that its
website would be completed within approximately two weeks,
and stated that plaintiff would be making a partial $15,000
payment to me.
(R. 0124)
In paragraph 9 of his Affidavit Mr. Marin testifies that
[o]n April 12, 2005, I spoke again with Gary Young regarding
plaintiff's failure to provide the marketing tools. Mr.
Young responded by telling me that he would "get to the
bottom" of the problem and see what he could do.
2

(R. 0124-0123)
In paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Affidavit, Mr. Marin
testifies that
[o]n April 26, 2005, I telephoned Mr. Stirling regarding
plaintiff's failure to provide the promised marketing tools.
Mr. Stirling again assured me that they would be provided
soon and again requested my patience... On May 3, 200[5],
Mr. Stirling notified my that he had received an e-mail from
Rainmaker Consulting (i.e., "John's Folks") "which indicated
they are making progess" on the website- Mr. Stirling asked
me to "hold tight." A copy of the e-mail is attached
hereto. Thus, 49 days after plaintiff stopped making
payments to me in accordance with the terms of the
Agreement, plaintiff acknowledged that it had still not
provided me with the marketing tools which were absolutely
essential for me to be able to do my job and again requested
my continued patience.
(R. 0123)
Finally, in paragraph 13 of his Affidavit Mr. Marin
testifies that
[o]n or about June 8, 2005, when plaintiff had still not
provided any of the marketing tools which I needed in order
to do my job, I spoke with Mr. Young and informed him that I
believed I had been patient long enough in waiting for the
repeatedly promised marketing tools and that I could no
longer afford to continue my contractual relationship with
plaintiff.
(R. 0123-0122)
Mr. Marin respectfully submits that hi^ testimony regarding
the course of dealing and conduct of the parties is sufficient to
establish issues of fact as to: (a) whether plaintiff failed to
act consistently with the parties' agreed ujJ>on common purpose of
marketing and distributing plaintiff's product through a
mainstream network marketing modeJ
3

whether pi,; m. iff failed

to act consistently with Mr. Marin's justified expectation that
plaintiff would provide Mr. Marin with the marketing tools
necessary in order for him to be able to satisfy his performance
guarantees; and (c) whether plaintiff failed to cooperate in
providing the necessary marketing tools thereby making it
difficult or impossible for Mr. Marin to meet his performance
guarantees and is now attempting to take advantage of the nonperformance which it caused.
II.

PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO RELY ON THE INTEGRATION
CLAUSE TO CIRCUMVENT ITS COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING.
Plaintiff recognizes that in Brown

v.

Moore,

973 P.2d 950,

954 (Utah 1998), the Court held that w [i]n determining whether a
party has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
we are not limited to an examination of the express contractual
provisions; we will also consider the course of dealing between
the parties." (Citations omitted)(emphasis added).
plaintiff contends that "Brown's

Nevertheless,

holding is unhelpful to Marin,

because there was a clear integration clause in the Agreement
Marin signed, specifically excluding implied obligations or
^representations' from the parties' written Agreement."

(Resp.

Br. 24).
Plaintiff's contention is misplaced for two reasons.

First,

the integration clause in the Agreement which Mr. Marin signed
does not specifically exclude implied obligations.
4

More

importantly, plaintiff provides no authority which would support
the proposition that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing may be circumvented by an integration clause.

Mr. Marin

has found no such authority; but has found authority to the
contrary.

In their exhaustive treatise on the subject of

"Contractual Good Faith," the authors conclude that although the
issue has not been resolved by extensive case law, parties should
not be allowed to disclaim the obligation to perform in good
faith: "A contract clause providing, for example, that a party
^shall not be bound by any obligation of good faith under this
contract' should not be enforceable."

Steven J. Burton and Eric

G. Anderson, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH Formation,
Breach,

Enforcement

Performance,

§ 3.2.5 Disclaimers of Good Faith at p. 72. 1

Plaintiff also suggests that the Court could adopt the
"well-reasoned" holding of the Court of Appeals of Ohio in

States

Construction

Corporation

v. Harbor Bay Estates,

Ltd.,

United

876

N.E.2d 637, 1 42 at 643 (Ohio 2007), that "[t]he implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used to make an end run
around the parol evidence rule."
description of the Harbor
curious.

(Resp. Br. 33).

Bay Estates

Plaintiff's

case a^s "well-reasoned" is

Not only is the Ohio court's statement dictum, but its

1

It is also noteworthy that (while the Contract at issue in
this case is not governed by the UCC) the Utah Uniform Commercial
Code specifically prohibits any agreement to disclaim the
obligation of good faith. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-la-302(2).
5

opinion provides no reasoning or analysis with respect to this
issue.

Id.

Bay Estates

Further, as authority for its statement th€*

Harbor

court cites an earlier decision of the Court of

Appeals of Ohio in McNulty

v. PLS Acquisition

Corp.,

8th Dist.

No. 79025, 2002-Ohio-7220, 2002 WL 31875200, 1 24, which is
easily distinguishable from the case at bar.

There, the court

explained that
The record clearly indicates that the oral promises and
representations were made prior to the execution of the
contracts. McNulty cannot attempt to rewrite an unambiguous
written contract with provisions he knew were not included.
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot
be used to make an end run around the parol evidence rule.
Id.

(emphasis added).
In the case at bar, Mr. Marin relies not only on

representations made prior to the execution of the parties'
agreement, but also on the parties' continuing course of dealing
and conduct through the several months after its execution.

He

is, therefore, not attempting to make an end run around the parol
evidence rule.
Further, even if an integration clause might otherwise
operate to circumvent the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, the parol evidence rule has a "very narrow application"
and operates to exclude only prior or contemporaneous
conversations, representation, or statements.
Family

Trust

v.

Tangren,

E.g.,

Tangren

2008 UT 20, 5 11, 182 P.3d 326.

6

It does

not apply to subsequent conversations, representations, or
statements.

E.g.,

Edition, § 3.2(a).

Calamari

and Perillo

on Contracts,

Fifth

Accordingly, the parol evidence rule would

not apply to paragraphs 5, 7-9, and 11-13 of Mr. Marin's
affidavit because they relate to conversations, representations,
and statements made subsequent to the execution of the parties'
agreement.
III. MR. MARIN CONCURS WITH PLAINTIFF'S SUGGESTION THAT IT SHOULD
BE ALLOWED TO SUBMIT A REVISED FEE AFFIDAVIT AND ALLOW THE
TRIAL COURT TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES.
Mr. Marin appreciates plaintiff's admission that it is not
entitled to recover attorney fees related to its tort and other
non-contract claims, and in connection with issues on which it
did not prevail.

Mr. Marin also believes that it would be

appropriate for plaintiff to submit a revised fee affidavit to
the trial court if it prevails on this appeal and that it would
then be within the discretion of the trial court to determine
whether plaintiff's reduced fee request is reasonable.
Mr. Marin will respond briefly to the arguments which
plaintiff has made in support of the trial court's fee award.
A.

Attorney fee awards must be reasonable even in default
cases.

Plaintiff argues that it was appropriate for the trial court
to award attorney fees without making a finding of reasonableness
because Mr. "Marin's objection was untimely and the award was
7

therefore uncontested."
without merit.

(Resp. Br. 35). This argument is

Even in default cases the trial court is not

bound by the prevailing party's affidavit, but must independently
determine the amount of a reasonable attorney fee.

See Amyx

Columbia

Rule 73 of

House,

2005 UT App 118, 55, 110 P.3d 176.

v.

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically requires that "a
request for attorney fees shall be supported by affidavit or
testimony" setting forth, inter alia, "factors showing the
reasonableness of the fees."

There would be no reason for

testimony "showing the reasonableness of the fees" unless a
finding on that issue is required.

The only circumstances in

which Rule 73 does not require a showing of the reasonableness is
where "the party claims attorney fees in accordance with the
schedule in subsection (d) or in accordance with Utah Code
Section 75-3-718 and no objection to the fee has been made."
Rule 73(a), URCP (emphasis added).
B.

It was not reasonable for plaintiff to spend t€5ns of
thousands of dollars in attorney fees addressing an
issue which it acknowledges Mr. Marin "has never
disputed or even addressed."

Despite the fact that this case was decided on summary
judgment without either party having conducted any discovery,
plaintiff contends that it is more than a simple breach of
contract case because "Pre-Tangren, Young Living was prudent in
fulfilling its obligation under Hall

8

to provide *all relevant'

evidence to the trial court on the issue of integration."
Br. 36). This contention is unpersuasive.

(Resp.

As plaintiff

correctly acknowledges, Mr. "Marin has never disputed or even
addressed the integration clause."

(Resp. Br. 14). Accordingly,

contrary to plaintiffs assertion, Mr. Marin respectfully submits
that it was incredibly inefficient for plaintiff to have spent
tens of thousands of dollars addressing an issue which has never
been in dispute.2
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing additional reasons, Mr. Marin respectfully
requests that the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals be
reversed and that this action be remanded to the Court of Appeals
with instructions for remand to the trial court for a trial on
the merits.

(^.

DATED this / / d a ? of May 2010.

tf^Mitchell
;orney for Petitioner

2

Mr. Marin also finds interesting plaintiff's assertion that
it "sought for and obtained Marin's approval of extensions to
respond" to Mr. Marin's counter-motion for summary judgment. Mr.
Marin's counsel does not recall any such requests and there is
nothing in the record which would substantiate them. However,
Mr. Marin does not deny that they were made and his counsel's
normal practice would be to grant them as a matter of courtesy.
That saidf however, having granted plaintiff a nearly four month
extension, Mr. Marin finds it curious that plaintiff would now
take issue with the filing of Mr. Marin's objection to
plaintiff's fee affidavit only seven days after it was due.
9

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Undersigned/certifies that two copies of the foregoing were
mailed this /ffi^day of May 2010 via first class U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Barnard N. Madsen
Scott D. Preston
Joseph M. Hepworth
FILLMORE SPENCER LLC
3301 N. University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84604
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